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Purpose: The aim of the paper is three-fold. First, it examines nuances that specific camouflaging 
perspectives provide to enhance traditional and widely adopted theories in social and 
environmental accounting. Second, within research on camouflaging, the paper stimulates 
multidisciplinarity and cross-fertilization by presenting recent developments in organization 
theory that hold promise for enhancing our understanding of camouflaging. Finally, it discusses 
how the research contributions published in this special issue help advance the notion of 
corporate camouflaging. 
Design/methodology/approach: The paper makes use of an extensive literature review and 
discusses research implications related with the choice of theoretical framework. 
Findings: The idea of camouflaging may provide narrower and more refined perspective(s) that can 
help researchers delve deeper into their topic of interest and thereby support potentially 
substantive contributions to the field.  
Originality/value: The paper offers suggestions for future social and environmental accounting 
research that adopts the concepts of organized hypocrisy, organizational façades, and functional 
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1. Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed expressions such as corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
sustainability and sustainable development coming into prominence and becoming important issues 
internationally within the political and organizational agenda. However, there is an increasingly 
astonishing contrast between, on the one hand, the world-wide growth of corporate campaigns of 
social commitment and civic sense, the issue of glossy social and environmental reports, the 
claimed corporate attention to stakeholders and, on the other hand, multiple chains of corporate 
scandals, financial frauds, and environmental disasters, which appear to deny any societal 
commitment by these firms. 
A substantial and growing number of accounting scholars have investigated these issues. 
Researchers have been interested in understanding how accounting could support firms’ moves 
toward (or even away from) socially responsible behaviours (Patten, 2002; Moneva et al., 2006; 
Cho and Patten, 2007; Cormier and Magnan, 2007; Berrone et al., 2009; Rodrigue et al., 2013; 
Larrinaga, 2014). To date there is not a unique answer to such questions, not only because it is 
challenging to assess a firm’s impact on social and environmental sustainability, but also because 
accounting applied to sustainability appears itself a complex and sometimes ambivalent notion 
(Tinker and Gray, 2003; Hopwood, 2009; Gray, 2010). Sustainability and accounting at the firm 
level can be subsumed into four strictly related categories (Gray, 2010): 1) general discourse around 
business, 2) specific corporate reporting, 3) initiatives designed to advance environmental and 
social agendas, and 4) organizational articulations of sustainability activities. In each of these 
categories researchers have explored firms’ choices regarding how accounting devices might be 
adopted to improve corporate behaviour or to manage impressions by promoting a misleading 
image of corporate social responsibility to external stakeholders. Hopwood’s (2009) discussion on 
the role of accounting for environmental matters also pointed to the risk of diverging/contrasting 
firms’ behaviours with regard to the illusory openness of reporting. On one hand, the reporting may 
cast “light on what is often invisible” (p. 437), therefore giving visibility to social and 
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environmental impacts of firms’ activities; on the other, it is possible to use reporting to construct a 
veil that obfuscates a more realistic and balanced presentation of firm performance.  
Within this debate, the aim of the paper is three-fold. First, the paper briefly reviews and 
synthesize the most widely adopted theories used in accounting to investigate corporate behaviour 
and its impact on society and the environment. This overview is meant to shed light on the nuance 
that the use of a specific camouflaging thesis/perspective may provide. Recalling Unerman's 2008 
(p. 363) commentary on “Corporate social reporting and reputation risk management”, by 
Bebbington, Larrinaga-Gonzales and Moneva (2008): "broad theories which provide innovative 
perspectives in embryonic fields of study become progressively less insightful as the field develops 
and as many more studies are based on the same broad theoretical perspectives". In this context, 
Reputation Risk Management (RMM) and, we add, the idea of camouflaging, may provide 
narrower and more refined perspective(s) that can help researchers delve deeper and thereby 
continue making substantive contributions to the field. Therefore, similarly to RMM, camouflaging 
may be used to complement the existing well-developed theories in order to further inspire and 
innovate future studies in the CSR literature. Second, with respect to camouflaging research, the 
paper aims to stimulate multidisciplinarity and cross-fertilization by presenting recent developments 
in organization theory that hold promise for furthering our understanding of corporate efforts to 
truthfully report or camouflage their social and environmental performance. Specifically, we 
discuss organized hypocrisy, organizational façades, and functional stupidity in organizations, 
offering suggestions for future research that adopts these perspectives. Third, we present the 
research contributions published in this special issue and how they advance the notion of corporate 
camouflaging of social and environmental performance. 
Opportunities for camouflaging arise because, most often, stakeholders do not have the 
opportunity (e.g. access to information) to assess the actual social and environmental impact of 
corporate activities. Moreover, companies do not consult appropriately with stakeholders, there are 
no mandatory reporting guidelines, audit requirements or enforcement mechanisms, resulting in 
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what has been referred to as the reporting-performance portrayal gap (Adams, 2004). We argue that 
this portrayal gap, as well as other forms of green washing1, is evidence of camouflaging. The 
perspective of camouflaging, therefore, explains the findings of prior research (the portrayal gap) 
and has lead scholars to provide possible solutions to the problem of knowledge of contested 
situations (Dey, 2010). Prior work has called for greater accountability and stronger focus on 
corporate processes and governance systems to reduce the portrayal gap (Adams, 2004; Solomon, 
2013) and proposed a shift from an organization-centred form of reporting towards more 
independent and stakeholder driven approach (Dey, 2007). Various contributions (e.g. Gallhofer, et 
al. 2006, Dey, 2010) propose alternative forms of reporting, produced by external parties and via 
multiple data sources, mainly external to the firm. These reports, which fall under different names - 
e.g. "counter accounts" (Gallhofer et al., 2006, Dey, 2010)2 - "reveal contradictions between what 
companies choose to report and what they suppress, problematizing their activities and providing 
new insights into their social and environmental impacts" (Dey, 2010). Moreover, under the 
camouflaging perspective, research has analyzed the misleading behaviour itself (rather than 
solutions to it) by investigating its characteristics, tools adopted, and possible ways to detect it. 
Camouflaging would be related to the symbolic (as opposed to the substantial) reporting of firms 
actions and the use of other signals of corporate environmental responsibility (e.g. assurance, 
reporting guidelines and ad hoc forms of reporting) in order to portray an image of environmental 
commitment and to convince relevant stakeholders that their expectations have been met (Moneva 
et al., 2006; Mahoney et al. 2012; Michelon et al. 2015). The investigation of the factors that might 
explain inconsistencies between CSR actions and reporting, as well as the implications of the 
research findings, is closely related to the theoretical background utilized by the researchers.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Green washing has been defined as: "selective disclosure of positive information about a company’s environmental or 
social performance, without full disclosure of negative information on these dimensions, so as to create an overly 
positive corporate image" (Lyon and Maxwell, 2011, p. 9). 
2 As highlighted by Dey et al. (2010): “These problematizing external accounts have been referred to by a number of 
different terms including social audits (Medawar 1976), deindustrialization audits (Harte and Owen 1987), silent 
accounts (Gray 1997), shadow accounts (Gray 1997; Gibson et al. 2001), reporting-performance portrayal gap analysis 
(Adams 2004), social accounts (Cooper et al. 2005), and counter accounts (Gallhofer et al. 2006)". 
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Our paper presents several contributions. First, it builds and extends this research, by 
providing a discussion of existing theories used to study and address camouflaging practices and 
proposing new theoretical lenses to further enhance our knowledge on this phenomenon. Thus, it 
complements previous general review of the field of social and environmental accounting research 
(e.g. Mathews, 1997; Adams, 2002; Gray 2002; Parker, 2005). Second, responds to the call by 
Hopwood (2009) to urgently to explore the “thickening” of the corporate veil, which we refer to as 
camouflaging, by suggesting “new” management theories to further our understanding of reporting-
related processes and behaviours within organisations. Third, fostering Adams’s assertion (2002, p. 
245): “the theories of social reporting have been developed without an explicit attempt to engage 
those companies that do report”, our contribution relies in encouraging adoption of theories 
“borrowed” by other disciplines such as management and organisation studies to enhance our 
understanding of corporate processes. Finally, in light of these perspectives and theoretical lenses, 
we invite scholars to investigate new and important research questions, such as why and how 
corporations manage conflicting stakeholder demands and how they limit the range of perspectives 
that management use in identifying and addressing broad scale problems and externalities.  
In the following sections, the paper presents some reflections on the main theoretical 
approaches used by on-going literature to study the camouflaging phenomenon. Section three 
proposes new theoretical lenses through which future research can analyse camouflaging practices. 
Section four concludes the paper by presenting the other articles published in this special issue and 
discussing how they are positioned in the framework that we propose herein.  
 
2. Assessing the current literature 
 Extant research on social and environmental accounting and reporting has drawn from 
several key theoretical bases. Collectively, these theories have led to a substantial body of research 
literature that captures many facets of organizational justifications and strategies for reporting. In 
this section we review the major theoretical perspectives adopted in this stream of research and 
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suggest ways in which the notion of corporate camouflaging can be used to enhance future work 
grounded in each theory.  
We start by discussing political economy theory, which provides a very broad framework for 
contextualizing social and environmental disclosure and explaining firms' camouflaging behaviours. 
Also it is strictly related3 to three main theories widely used in social and environmental disclosure: 
legitimacy theory, institutional theory and stakeholder theory. We then discuss legitimacy theory 
not only because is one of the most widely used (see Owen, 2008) but especially because it 
introduces the notion of legitimacy which is the underlying concept for the other theoretical 
perspectives. However, legitimacy theory is complementary to other theories providing insights on 
how legitimacy is practically obtained. Institutional theory is discussed as it relates to the process of 
seeking (institutional) legitimacy. As highlighted by Chen and Roberts (2010), depending on the 
purpose of legitimation, there are primarily two levels of legitimacy – institutional legitimacy and 
organizational (or strategic) legitimacy. Resource dependence and stakeholder perspectives, that are 
more relevant to the process of strategic legitimacy, are then addressed. We conclude this overview 
by presenting the impression management perspective because it represents an interesting stream of 
research sustained by an array of previous theoretical approaches, such as legitimacy theory, 
institutional theory, resource dependence theory (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007) and stakeholder 
theory. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See Deegan and Unerman (2006) and Gray, Owen and Adams (1996) for a description of the two broad streams of 
political economy theory: i.e. classical (Marxian) and bourgeois political economy, and of their relationships with 
legitimacy, institutional and stakeholders theories. In summary, according to Parker (2005, p. 847), Marxian political 
economy places class interests and conflict and structural inequity at the centre of its concerns, whilst bourgeois 
political economy mostly discounts such concerns and adopts a pluralistic view of the world (Gray et al., 1995). Whilst 
institutional theory can be applied and is related to both, the streams of political economy, legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory are derived from the bourgeois political economy. According to Parker (2005, p. 847) these two 
approaches “are therefore vastly different, although they share a common recognition that accounting disclosures are 
economic, social and political tools for constructing, and sustaining ideologies and their related economic and 
institutional arrangements that serve the disclosing organisation’s private interests. They can be employed to transmit 
the disclosing organisation’s social, political and economic interpretations to a pluralistic audience (Guthrie and Parker, 
1990). On one hand they may reveal underlying rationales for disclosure, its variant forms and even non-disclosure 
(Guthrie and Parker, 1989). On the other hand, they may point to the need for radical and system change in the balance 
of power relationships between organisations, their interested parties and communities, with a view to radically changed 
transparency and accountability."	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2.1 Political economy theory (and political economy of Accounting) 
Political economy theory, as applied to accounting studies (also known as Political Economy 
of Accounting - PEA), "is concerned with exploring and assessing the ways various social 
protagonists use accounting information and corporate reporting to mediate, suppress, mystify and 
transform social conflict. The approach places class relations at the forefront of the analysis and is 
concerned with the effects … on the distributions of income, wealth and power." (Tinker and 
Neimark, 1987 p. 71-72). Within this perspective, disclosure is analysed and understood in relation 
to a very broad social, economic and political context (Gray et al., 1995; Adams and Harte, 1998; 
Adams, 2002) and focus on the use reporting on the distribution of income, wealth and power in 
society (Cooper and Sherer. 1984). This perspective is functional to the idea of camouflaging as, for 
instance, according to Guthrie and Parker (1990, p.166): "corporate reports cannot be considered as 
neutral on unbiased documents but rather are a product of the interchange between the firm and its 
environment”, and more interestingly, as "social, political and economics documents. They serve as 
a tool for constructing, sustaining, and legitimizing economic and political arrangements, 
institutions and ideological themes, which contribute to the corporation's private interests. 
Disclosures have the capacity to transmit social, political, and economic meanings for a pluralistic 
set of report recipients".  
One well-cited study in the field, which performs a longitudinal analysis of social 
disclosures in 100 years of annual reporting by a dominant corporation in the Australian mining 
industry, is Guthrie and Parker (1989).  Results supports the argument that corporate disclosure is a 
very variable activity (Adams, 2002) and a proactive process of information provided from 
management's perspective, designed to set and shape the agenda of debate and to mediate, suppress, 
mystify and transform social conflict. In this context political economy theory is supported as it 
"recognises the potential for management to tell its own story or to refrain from doing so, according 
to his own self interest" (Guthrie and Parker, 1989, p. 351), and thus suggesting that disclosure may 
be used as a camouflaging strategy. 
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2.2 Legitimacy theory  
According to legitimacy theory firms are social creations whose very existence depends on 
the willingness of the wider society to support them. Thus, organizations aim to establish 
congruence between the social values associated or implied by their activities and the social values, 
norms and belief systems of the environment they are part of (Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). As far as 
these two value systems are aligned, they speak to organizational legitimacy (Lindblom, 1994, 
O'Dwyer, 2002, Parker 2005).  
The corporate quest for legitimation results in firms undertaking strategic tactics aimed at 
convincing society-at-large that an organization is a legitimate institution (Dowling and Pfeffer, 
1975; Guthrie and Parker, 1989; Lindblom, 1994; Suchman, 1995). Many of these tactics involve 
managing public perceptions of an organization in response to social pressure (Lindblom, 1994; 
Bansal and Roth, 2000; Neu et al., 1998; O'Donovan, 1999) through the disclosure of (non 
complete or partial) information regarding firms’ social and environmental impacts (Gray, Walters 
et al., 1995; Patten, 2005; Hopwood, 2009). In particular, firms may manipulate public perception 
through a specific strategy, based on a deliberate effort to deflect public attention from a relevant 
issue to a minor one, often emotionally charged (Lindblom, 1994). 
Studies investigating the motives and determinants of CSR disclosure find support for this 
theory highlighting that for instance, companies under the spotlight (e.g., very large companies or 
companies belonging to "sensitive" industries) disclose a larger amount of social and environmental 
information in order to respond to social and political pressure (Patten, 2014). However, as 
observed by Bebbington et al. (2008, p. 338), many authors also posited that "legitimacy theory 
provides an explanatory frame for (especially positive) social and environmental disclosure (Patten, 
1992; Brown and Deegan, 1998; Deegan et al., 2002; Milne and Patten, 2002; O’Donovan, 2002;  
and for a review of this literature Deegan, 2002)" and that "there is also evidence that organizations 
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attempt to manage their reputation risks by means of their CSR reports"4 (Bebbington et al, 2008, p. 
341), that, thus, become part of a reputation risk management processes more than accountability5 
tools. Based on the idea of reputation risk management, concealment and camouflage would be 
implicit in some intentional changes to the firm’s activities aiming to manage (create, maintain or 
repair) its reputation, without aiming to improve the social or environmental impact of firm's 
activities.  
Within the legitimacy perspective, one of the most cited studies in this area is Cho and 
Patten (2007). They explore the use of CSR disclosure as a legitimation tool by investigating the 
relationship between environmental performance and environmental disclosure. They find that total 
financial report non-litigation-related environmental disclosure is higher for worse environmental 
performers. Moreover, they find that the extent of monetary environmental disclosure by worse 
performers belonging to environmentally sensitive industries was significantly higher than similar 
disclosures made by either (1) their better performing counterparts within the environmentally 
sensitive group, or (2) their direct counterparts within the non-environmentally sensitive group. 
These results suggest that environmental disclosure is used as a camouflaging tool in order to 
portray an image of commitment (for the poor environmental performers) or to respond to societal 
pressures in environmentally sensitive industries. At a broader level, this evidence shows how 
voluntary environmental reporting may serve as a potential impediment to future improvements of 
corporate environmental performance (Cho et al., 2012): i.e., the possibility to project a positive, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Stemming from this evidence, "one emerging explanation for CSR reporting has been suggested by reporting 
proponents (Herbst, 1998; GRI, 2002; Rayner, 2001; Starovic, 2002; KPMG, 2005), practitioners (Co-operative 
Financial Services, 2003) and researchers (Friedman and Miles, 2001; Toms, 2002; Hasseldine et al., 2005) of CSR 
reporting, is that it could be conceived as both an outcome of and part of reputation risk management (hereafter RRM) 
processes." (Bebbington et al., 2008, p. 338). While, in our common understanding, legitimacy and reputation share 
many similarities4 and are occasionally used interchangeably in accounting (Chalmers and Godfrey, 2004, p. 121) and 
in social accounting (Deegan, 2002, p. 296), they also present substantive differences. As pointed out by Deephouse and 
Carter (2005, p. 332) whilst “legitimacy is the social acceptance resulting from adherence to regulative, normative or 
cognitive norms and expectations, reputation is based on a social/relative comparison among organizations on a variety 
of attributes, which could include these same regulative, normative or cognitive dimensions. In this perspective 
reputation would have [only] a second order impact on the legitimacy of the organization." 
5 Note that some studied proposed (also) the accountability theory to analyse organizational reporting activities (see, for 
example, Gray et al., 1988; 1991); however this paper accepts what Gray et al. (1995) suggested, that is to say that 
accountability theory is essentially a normative conception of organizational reporting and it is not an especially helpful 
perspective for the interpretation of CSR practice. 
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favourable picture of the firm may reduce the incentives for companies to work toward improving 
their actual or future performance. In this perspective, the idea of camouflaging facilitates the 
identification of a different notion of legitimacy and the (symbolic) strategies that may be used to 
acquire it.  
 
2.3 Institutional theory  
Although overlapping with legitimacy theory, institutional theory is more focused on the 
process of acquisition of legitimacy via conforming to other similar social institutions (Chen and 
Roberts, 2010), i.e., institutional legitimacy. One central concept in institutional theory is the idea of 
isomorphism i.e. the process by which structures and practices are progressively homogenized to 
increase the possibilities of success and as a response to expectations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
It explains the process by which sustainability practices become legitimate and largely routinized 
among companies that share a common language and norms with other actors in this field. The idea 
of isomorphism helps us better understand the fact that, despite CSR reports are not mandatory, 
they become institutions, i.e. de facto norms. These norms resonate with society as, for example, a 
positive value is attributed to the provision of some kind of assurance to the sustainability reports, 
as well as to the disclosure about some kind of activity designed to engage stakeholders (Larrinaga, 
2014). However, institutional theory acknowledges that, despite firms are characterized by a high 
level of resilience, there are also some institutional forces that are self-reinforcing. In this sense, the 
enduring nature of institutions represents the basis for critiques of sustainability practices (including 
reporting) that portray a credible, but false, image of corporate responsiveness to societal demands 
through a highly standardized practice whose value is taken-for-granted. Thus, sustainability 
reporting is a largely irrelevant exercise, not drawing the attention of stakeholders, which are not 
using this information (Larrinaga, 2014). 
An influential study in this field is the O'Dwyer and Owen (2005). They critically analyse a 
common CSR practice often interpreted as a symbol for commitment to CSR: the assurance of 
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environmental, social and sustainability reports. Their main finding discloses "a large degree of 
management control over the reporting, and indeed assurance, process. Assurance providers are 
appointed by management, who may place any restrictions they choose on the assurance exercise" 
(O'Dwyer and Owen 2005, p. 224).  
Within institutional theory, a camouflaging perspective contributes to our understanding of 
the motives underlying the implementation of practices that are considered as symbols of CSR 
commitments and the degree to which these practices are part of a green strategy or a camouflaging 
exercise. For example, firms could be pressured to adopt generic CSR initiatives instead of specific 
activities that are more appropriate for their business. In these cases, the risk is the proliferation of 
general environmental and philanthropic initiatives that adopt isomorphic behaviours, without 
actually impacting social or environmental progress. Along similar lines, other authors suggest that, 
regardless of the differences in the social and environmental issues firms face, they adopt similar 
CSR reporting patterns due to isomorphic pressures (de Villiers et al., 2014). In other words, firms’ 
choices on the use of CSR reporting practices (such as the GRI adoption) may be “developed 
independent of local issues and concerns” (p. 210) and, not irrelevant within the issue of 
camouflaging, produce inconsistencies between symbolic social and environmental performance 
(i.e. the adoption of GRI) and substantive performance. Thus, the ultimate result may be the 
institutionalization of camouflaging itself, i.e., companies may use isomorphic behaviours of 
symbolic (camouflaging) practices without addressing, through substantive actions, the social and 
environmental impact of their business activity. 
 
2.4  Resource Dependence Theory 
Among strategic perspectives, resource dependence theory focuses on the environment as a 
source of vital resources for a firm’s survival. Within resource dependence theory, the environment 
is not simply a given condition to be absorbed, avoided, or accepted (like in legitimacy theory) but 
it is the dynamic outcome of interactions between many organizations seeking their own goals and 
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interests (Chen and Roberts, 2010) and securing for themselves the resources they need6. The role 
of organizational power is particularly relevant and the means used by firms to acquire and defend it 
from other firms are identified into five specific actions: 1) integration, 2) joint ventures and other 
inter-organizational relationships, 3) board of directors, 4) political actions, and 5) executive 
succession (Ulrich and Barney, 1984). In this vein, legitimacy itself (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; 
2003) and a socially acceptable reputation (Unerman, 2008) can be seen as intangible resources that 
are both necessary for firm survival. These resources are obtained by companies through a number 
of strategies, including those related to employee selection, board composition, stakeholders’ 
relations to political actions, and strategic alliances.  
Examining corporations’ efforts to acquire resources through camouflaging negative social 
and environmental impacts may provide additional insights into corporate sustainability 
motivations.  Within resource dependence theory, one interesting "setting" from a camouflaging 
perspective is how alliances can be used as an effective instrument when seeking legitimacy7; these 
are of particular interest especially when they involve partnerships (or joint environmental 
programs) with governmental agencies, local community groups, NGOs etc., or any other 
"environmental-friendly" partner that may symbolize a culture of environmental concern when 
alliances are established. Other camouflaging actions may relate, for instance, to the use of 
environment-related governance practices. In this perspective, an interesting paper by Rodrigue et 
al. (2013) investigates whether environmental governance practices are substantive or symbolic in 
terms of their impact on environmental management (as proxied by environmental performance and 
environmental capital expenditures), in other words whether environmental governance 
mechanisms are used as a camouflaging strategy. Resource dependence theory helps develop the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 In particular, Ulrich and Barney (1984) claim that “acquiring external resources needed for the organization comes by 
decreasing the organization's dependence on others and/or by increasing others' dependence on it, that is, modifying an 
organization's power relations with other organizations. The resource dependence perspective rests on a number of 
assumptions that explain how organizations work to acquire power” (p. 472).  
7 Chen and Roberts (2010) note: “For example, Fiedler and Deegan (2002) document that seeking legitimacy was one 
key incentive for the building and construction industry to collaborate with the environmental groups in Australia. In 
addition, Friedman and Miles (2002) analyze the relationship between Greenpeace and environmental sensitive 
corporations over the decades. " (Chen and Roberts, 2010 p. 657). 
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three environmental governance practices on which the authors focus, i.e. the existence of an 
environmental committee, the proportion of environmentally aware directors on the board, and the 
presence of environmental incentives in executive compensation. Overall, the paper comes to the 
conclusion that: "environmental governance mechanisms are part of a symbolic approach to manage 
stakeholder perceptions of environmental management, with limited substantive impact on 
environmental performance." (Rodrigue et al. 2013, p. 123). 
 
2.5 Stakeholder theory 
According to stakeholder theory, the firm is at the centre of a complex network of 
stakeholders whose concerns need to be understood and addressed for the continued survival of the 
firm (Freeman, 1984). However, different internal and external stakeholders groups have 
differential levels of power and ability to influence the actions of an organization (Mitchell et al., 
1997; Deegan, 2002; Parker, 2005; Chen and Roberts, 2010), and therefore a firm often faces a 
multitude of conflicting stakeholders pressures and demands. The perspective adopted here is that 
of management, who attempt to control their environment, assessing the importance of meeting 
stakeholder demands in order to achieve the strategic objectives of the firm and to balance 
contrasting expectations to obtain at least the approval of the most powerful stakeholders (Gray et 
al., 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997; Parker, 2005).  
One of the ways through which stakeholders’ needs and expectations are understood and 
addressed is through stakeholder engagement, which is seen as a practice the organization 
undertakes "to involve stakeholders in a positive manner in organizational activities" (Greenwood, 
2007).  As Greenwood states: "There is an apparent soundness of logic to the assumption that the 
more an organization engages with its stakeholders, the more accountable and responsible that it is 
likely to be towards these stakeholders. This responsibility assumption presumes that the act of 
stakeholder engagement in and of itself delivers some benefit towards stakeholders and is, 
therefore, an act of responsibility towards stakeholders." (Greenwood, 2007, p. 316).  
	   14	  
Whilst GRI and other institutional actors in the CSR field support the need for engaging 
with stakeholders, "there have been suggestions that stakeholder engagement exercises often 
constitute little more than management control devices used by managers to contain external 
pressures threatening key organizational objectives" (O'Dwyer, 2005, p. 280). In this context, the 
social reporting process, which is often depicted as a dialogue between the company and its 
stakeholder and a means by which the stakeholders can participate in the activities of the company, 
is erroneously interpreted as an act of responsibility (Roberts, 2003). Owen et al. (2001, p. 264) 
express concern about the ‘‘managerial capture’’ of social accounting and the broader social 
agenda: that is, ‘‘the means by which corporations, through the actions of their management, take 
control of the debate over what CSR [corporate social responsibility] involves by attempting to 
outline their own definition which is primarily concerned with pursuing corporate goals of 
stakeholder wealth maximisation’" (O’Dwyer, 2003, p. 524). Therefore, under a camouflaging 
perspective, social reporting on stakeholder engagement may be used by managers to demonstrate 
an "open attitude to CSR (by selectively choosing elements to suit business interests) as a way of 
demonstrating that they are listening to criticism, thereby further legitimising the status quo and, in 
effect, resisting any desired change..." (O'Dwyer, 2003, p. 525). 
With respect to the specific analysis of the CSR disclosure strategies, a relevant and 
engaging stream of research is impression management (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). 
Legitimacy theory, institutional theory, resource dependence theory (and, we add, stakeholder 
theory) can be fruitfully used as theoretical underpinnings of impression management research 
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). 
 
2.6 Impression management  
Impression management is a field of study derived from social psychology that focuses on 
how individuals present themselves to others in order to be perceived positively by them 
(Hooghiemstra, 2000, p. 609). In the context of corporate reporting, impression management can be 
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defined as a process in which managers select the information to release and present it in a way that 
distorts readers’ perceptions of corporate achievements (Neu, 1991; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 
1998, García-Osma and Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). Under this perspective, CSR reporting constitutes 
a camouflaging and opportunistic behaviour whereby managers exploit information asymmetries 
between them and firm external stakeholders by engaging in biased reporting. 
Users of CSR reports do not easily distinguish between one behaviour or the other, leaving 
ample room for camouflaging. Whilst mainstream disclosure studies suggest that the information 
disclosed is credible when it is associated with a cost, when it comes to CSR, camouflaging can be 
measured with respect to the underlying social and environmental performance and can also be 
detected by the analysis of quality of the information disclosed.   
In regards to the social and environmental performance relation, studies have provided 
mixed results. For example, Patten (2002) and Cho and Patten (2007) find that firms with worse 
environmental records (as measured by higher ratios of toxic chemical emissions to sales) have 
higher levels of environmental disclosures, suggesting a camouflaging approach to CSR disclosure 
while Clarkson et al. (2008) find that firms with better environmental records (again measured by 
toxic emissions) have higher levels of environmental disclosures suggesting a fair behaviour in 
disclosing CSR information.  
With regards to the quality of the information disclosed, camouflaging behaviours may be 
detected by means of quality disclosure indices (e.g. Michelon et al., 2015), informed and built on 
the impression management literature. Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) suggest two main 
camouflaging (i.e. impression management) strategies: (1) concealment or (2) attribution. 
Concealment can be achieved by either obfuscating negative outcomes (bad news) or emphasizing 
positive organizational outcomes (“good news”) whilst attribution is achieved when managers 
attribute positive organizational outcomes to internal factors (“entitlements”) and negative 
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organizational outcomes to external factors (“excuses”)8. Cho et al. (2010) extended this line of 
research by investigating the linguistic tone embedded in corporate environmental disclosures. They 
found evidence that worse corporate environmental performers included more optimistic language 
in their disclosures while better corporate environmental performers included more certainty 
language. Thus, corporations may camouflage poorer environmental performance through the use 
of specific types of language within their disclosures. 
 
3. Theoretical developments relevant to camouflaging 
 Collectively, the theories discussed in the prior section have proved invaluable in generating 
a rich literature on corporate social and environmental performance and reporting. From these 
studies we have gained keen insights into why and how corporations frame their social and 
environmental rhetoric and activities to gain support from stakeholders, institutions, and society-at-
large, all while their overriding commitment to shareholder value maximization remains entrenched 
as their core mission and responsibility. As accounting researchers continue to utilize the theories 
we reviewed to uncover and document strategies and empirical examples of corporate camouflaging 
of actual social and environmental performance, we believe that new develops in organization 
theory also can be beneficial in further progressing our overall understanding of this phenomenon. 
In this section we describe three theoretical perspectives that we believe hold promise in future 
research. These three perspectives were developed in the organization theory literature and have 
recently been used in accounting research. They are organized hypocrisy, organizational façades, 
and functional stupidity. Organized hypocrisy and organizational façades work together to provide 
an alternative lens from which to examine why and how corporations manage conflicting 
stakeholder demands. The notion of functional stupidity explicates how corporations limit the 
acceptable range of perspectives that management can use in identifying and addressing broad scale 
problems and externalities. 	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3.1 Organized hypocrisy and organizational façades 
 The theory of organized hypocrisy has been developed primarily by Nils Brunsson, who 
published his first book in this area in 1989, and has since published an extensive amount of related 
work (1993; 2002; 2007). Organized hypocrisy is an alternative theory that can be used to explain 
discrepancies between three observable outputs of an organization—its talk, decisions, and actions. 
Brunsson argues that organizations, such as corporations, use these three outputs to strategically 
manage conflicting demands that are placed on the organization by its stakeholders. According to 
Brunsson, the fact that stakeholders make mutually exclusive demands on the organization puts its 
management in a precarious moral position. For example, employees may demand improved work 
conditions while stockholders demand that analysts’ forecasted estimates of quarterly earnings be 
met. Because failing to satisfy a stakeholder demand raises the likelihood of alienating them and 
risking firm survival, management must find a way to at least pacify the demands of every key 
stakeholder group. Brunsson argues that each of the three organization’s outputs may be able to 
pacify or satisfy stakeholders in isolation—some demands may be satisfied by corporate talk, some 
by corporate decision, and some by corporate action. This idea rejects mainstream notions of 
strategic management. Unlike traditional theories in which talk, decision, and action are coupled (or 
perhaps loosely coupled) to flow in a logical sequence, organized hypocrisy purports that these 
three organizational outputs are not related in this expected manner. Rather, as Brunsson (2007, p. 
115–116) explains: 
In the model of [organized] hypocrisy talk, decisions and actions are still causally related, 
but the causality is the reverse: talk or decisions in one direction decrease the likelihood of 
corresponding actions, and actions in one direction decrease the likelihood of corresponding 
talk and decisions. The model of [organized] hypocrisy implies that talk, decisions and 
actions are ‘coupled’ rather than ‘decoupled’ or ‘loosely coupled’, but they are coupled in a 
way other than usually assumed. 
  
Lipson (2007) uses the term counter-coupled to describe this structured, yet inverse relationship 
among organizational talk, decisions, and action. Thus, the theory of organized hypocrisy predicts 
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that corporate leaders manage conflicting stakeholder demands at least partially through strategic 
inconsistencies in their organization’s talk, decisions, and actions. 
 Organized hypocrisy is a bit more sympathetic than legitimacy theory and impression 
management to the moral dilemma an organization faces in dealing with conflicting demands, 
principally by emphasizing that modern capitalism severely limits the choice set available to the 
management of individual corporations. For example, within this theory it is understood that the 
senior management of a global energy corporation cannot say, “we do not care about the 
environment” any more than it can cease exploring for new fossil fuel reserves. This is true because 
both choices are most likely unacceptable to some key stakeholder group. Thus, hypocrisy is 
viewed essentially as inevitable and in need of organizing. 
 Brunsson explains, however, that blatant hypocrisy is not socially acceptable either. So, how 
can senior management organize a corporation in a manner that utilizes hypocrisy strategically yet 
also is able to deny its use? According to Brunsson (1989), a corporation’s responses to conflicting 
stakeholder demands are developed in different areas within the organizational structure that, in 
essence, politicize the organization. The corporation is, thus, not a unified actor seeking societal 
legitimacy (or signalling superior performance), but rather a set of actors that handle stakeholder 
demands rather independently. This set of actors is organized around sub-structures (e.g., 
departments) that have their own part to play in the overall balancing of stakeholder demands. 
Brunsson’s perspective helps us understand how, for example, sustainability departments can 
publicly push greener corporate agendas, human resource departments can publicly push affirmative 
action policies, and corporate foundations can publicly push for greater amounts of philanthropy, 
even though corporate actions in these regards change little, if any. Each sub-structure uses talk, 
decisions, and actions to manage their responsibilities the best and perhaps even as sincerely as it 
can within the limits of the resources and authority granted by senior management. The semi-
autonomous nature of the development of these strategies makes their inconsistencies less likely to 
be suspect.  On this point, Cho et al., (2015, p. 81) conclude “a key strategy for senior management 
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is to orchestrate their talk, decision, and actions in a way that forms a legitimate solution, pacifies 
conflicting stakeholder demands, and yet does not reveal damaging discrepancies across these 
activities.”  
In summary, the notion of organized hypocrisy adds to our understanding of the 
camouflaging strategies adopted by corporations in that: (1) it conceives the organization as a set of 
actors that manage stakeholders demands independently; (2) it acknowledges (the existence of) 
contrasting stakeholders demands; (3) it highlights the counter-coupled use of talk, decision and 
actions to manage stakeholders demands through strategic inconsistencies. 
 Cho et al. (2015) apply the theory of organized hypocrisy to corporate sustainability 
reporting by combining the central concepts of this theory with related work on the notion of 
organizational façades. Abrahamson and Baumard (2008, p. 437) explain an organizational façade 
as “a symbolic front erected by organizational participants designed to reassure their organizational 
stakeholders of the legitimacy of the organization and its management.” Originally, the idea of an 
organizational façade was developed as a unitary, stable, symbolic front that was maintained by an 
organization to help ensure its on-going societal legitimacy. Abrahamson and Baumard (2008) 
further refined this perspective to include the possibility that organizations erect multiple façades to 
assist in managing diverse stakeholder demands. They discussed three specific types of façades: 
a. A rational façade is one that displays conformance with rational norms of business 
decision-making.  This façade is evidenced by the use of cost/benefit analyses, 
performance measurement systems, and market assessments. 
b. A progressive façade is rational and also displays a commitment to traditional notions of 
progress.  This façade is evidenced by the use of forward-thinking language, state-of-the-
art technology, and processes of continuous improvement. 
c. A reputation façade is one that deals with the image of the corporation. This façade is 
used to express lofty corporate values and display symbols of professed societal 
commitment. 
 
 The concepts of organized hypocrisy and organizational façades are leveraged by Cho et al. 
(2015) to attempt to further refine the analysis of corporate sustainability reporting. Abrahamson 
and Baumard’s work is used to articulate how corporate sustainability efforts can be analysed as 
distinct corporate sustainability façades. Their analysis can be briefly summarized as follows:  
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a. A rational sustainability façade is one that focuses on business sustainability. This 
façade is evidenced by a corporation’s advocacy for the business case for social and 
environmental activities, often using appeals to market logic to justify both proactive 
sustainability efforts and the limits of their responsibilities. 
b. A progressive sustainability façade is one that privileges social and environmental 
innovation and reform. In presenting this façade, the corporation extends the business 
case through the promotion of technological solutions to sustainability. Thus, a 
corporation will emphasize its ability to enhance long-term profitability with its 
development of alternative energy sources, more environmentally friendly products, 
and/or LEED certified buildings.   
c. A reputation sustainability façade is one that expresses corporate social and 
environmental stewardship beyond the business case. This façade emphasizes a 
corporation’s good citizenship activities such as its general philanthropic endeavours, 
support of the arts, or participation in anti-litter campaigns. 
 
Cho et al. (2015) applied organized hypocrisy and organizational sustainability façades in 
their empirical study of two multinational energy corporations that were interested in exploring for 
new oil and natural gas reserves in the U.S. Alaska Native Wildlife Refuge. Opening up this refuge 
to energy exploration has and continues to be a bitterly contested debate between business interests 
and environmentalists. Cho et al. concluded that the corporation’s talk, decisions, and actions 
seemed consistent within each façade but inconsistent across façades. Thus, organized hypocrisy 
appears present when examining how a corporation works to satisfy the demands of multiple 
stakeholder groups as opposed to examining particular efforts in isolation. 
When relating organized hypocrisy and organizational façades to the topic of corporate 
camouflaging of (un)sustainability, we see several promising avenues for future research and offer 
three specific suggestions. First, Cho et al. state that organizational talk, decisions, and actions that 
occur within a façade are not mutually exclusive to a particular façade. The politicization of the 
organization and its potential for engaging in hypocrisy depends on the ability of sub-structures to 
act independently. Thus, we believe that much more empirical work is needed to help us better 
understand how and where inside a corporation organizational sustainability façades are created, 
and how much coordination takes place across façades. These findings can directly impact future 
theorizing. Second, Brunsson (1989) spends considerable effort examining the temporal nature of 
an organization’s talk, decisions, and actions. Time is said to be on the organization’s side, in that 
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talk and decision can postpone the need for action. However, given growing scientific evidence and 
societal concerns associated with climate change, the temporal space between the employments of 
these outputs may be condensing. Future research can investigate the degree to which talk and 
decisions continue to placate stakeholder groups. The rise of environmental shareholder activism 
points to a decrease in the effectiveness of these outputs. In other words, sustainability talk may be 
losing its ability to camouflage unsustainable actions even though organizational façades have been 
erected. Third, organized hypocrisy and organizational façades might provide an alternative 
perspective on recent efforts by competing rule-making organizations to standardize corporate 
sustainability reporting. We think that issues such as materiality could enhance a corporation’s 
ability to maintain separate façades through engaging in more blatant forms of hypocrisy, i.e., more 
camouflaging.     
3.2 Functional stupidity 
 Alvesson and Spicer (2012, p. 1194) develop a stupidity-based theory of organizations that 
forwards the idea that organizations place serious restrictions on the “mobilization of cognitive 
capacities” such that they promote and sustain “functional stupidity.” Functional stupidity is defined 
as the “inability and/or unwillingness to use cognitive and reflective capacities in anything other 
than narrow and circumspect ways (p. 1201).” In their article, Alvesson and Spicer develop a very 
thorough, research-based model of functional stupidity that provides a comprehensive alternative to 
models of rational choice and variations on the idea of bounded rationality. We direct readers to 
their original work in order to appreciate and understand the full scope and scale of their model.  
For the purpose of our editorial, we discuss specific aspects of their model that we find most 
applicable to social and environmental accounting research. Although functional stupidity has been 
used recently in accounting research (Malsch et al., 2015), we are not aware of its use in the area of 
social and environmental accounting, in which we believe it holds promise. Therefore, we will 
briefly describe components of their model and suggest ways they might be utilized to study 
corporate social and environmental accounting and corporate camouflaging of (un)sustainability. 
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 Because it is a key aspect of their model, Alvesson and Spicer (2012, p. 1199) make clear 
that the concept of functional stupidity does not imply “pathology, irrationality, or dysfunctional 
thinking which disrupts the smooth functioning of organization life.” Quite the opposite might be 
true: “Rather, stupidity may be actively supported by organizations and may create rather 
‘functional’ outcomes.” This distinction between stupidity as a lack of brute mental ability and 
stupidity as an organizationally induced unwillingness to access one’s full mental capabilities is full 
of explanatory potential. It might be able to help us explain why and how organized hypocrisy and 
organizational façades can be developed and sustained. For example, it might help us better 
understand how absolutely decent individuals who sincerely care about people and the planet can 
work in the sustainability department of an oil and gas company or weapons contractors and be 
convinced that their work is virtuous and that they are not engaging in the camouflaging of 
corporate unsustainability. 
 Alvesson and Spicer (2012, p. 1199-1200) explain that functional stupidity is prevalent in 
organizations because organizations tend to nurture environments that structurally inhibit three 
distinct aspects of cognitive capacity (i.e., capacities that would help minimize functional stupidity). 
These three aspects are: 
a. Reflexivity: When an organization suppresses reflexivity it reduces the likelihood that 
employees will challenge its dominating values, norms, rules, and routines, or the 
morality of its actions. 
b. Justification: When an organization discourages its members from seeking justifications 
for the decision or action in which they are involved it reduces dialogue and moral 
scrutiny. Justifications become “managerial edicts” and core organizational problems are 
continually reproduced.  
c. Substantive reasoning:  When an organization inhibits substantive reasoning, the logic 
applied to specific situations becomes myopic and instrumental. The reasoning becomes 
“focused on the efficient achievement of a given end, and ignorance of the broader 
substantive questions about what that end actually is (p. 1200)” builds. The lack of 
substantive reasoning “frames questions in very narrow and focused ways (p. 1200).” 
 
Alvesson and Spicer (2012, p. 1202) argue that functional stupidity does not only operate at 
an individual level—it is “a general element of organizational processes.” Thus, Alvesson and 
Spicer theorize how organizations develop and sustain functional stupidity. They accomplish this by 
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presenting a thorough and well-reasoned set of theoretical arguments on what they term the 
“dynamics of functional stupidity.” A complete review of these dynamics is beyond the scope of 
our editorial but we find the context of their model, the precipitating factors labelled the economics 
of persuasion and symbolic manipulation, as very relevant to our discussion on social and 
environmental accounting. 
The economics of persuasion is the term Alvesson and Spicer (2012) use to describe the 
increasing importance of corporate efforts to generate consumer and general public desires, 
expectations, and significant affiliations for their company and their products. These efforts are 
designed to produce demand for their products beyond that reasonably expected from a utility 
perspective. Even producers of goods known to be in traditionally defined generic sectors of the 
economy, such as agriculture and energy, have become active in pursuing an image enhancement 
strategy that encourages more consumption and attempts to differentiate them from their 
competitors. Corporate efforts, therefore, become more focused on “branding, marketing, public 
relations, sales, and image building (p. 1203).” They argue that the economics of persuasion 
permeates organizational life in a way that now privileges symbolism over substance. Because of 
this, symbolic manipulation, defined as the “crafting of images and the engineering of fantasies (p. 
1203)”, is employed to manage the corporation’s level of functional stupidity. Symbolic 
manipulation is directed internally towards employees through strategic initiatives, which build 
well-defined organizational identities that help to cultivate a unified corporate culture. 
We believe that each of these components of the model of functional stupidity can be 
applied to social and environmental accounting research and provide two specific examples. First, 
we think that the qualitative research approach adopted by Malsch et al. (2015) could adapted for 
use in a study of sustainability reporting. Interviews can be undertaken with corporate employees to 
examine their cognitive capacities towards corporate sustainability initiatives. Though this, 
researchers can explore the extent to which a lack of reflexivity, justification, and substantive 
reasoning is embedded in the collective framing of CSR. Second, the contexts for functional 
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stupidity (i.e., the economics of persuasion and symbolic manipulation) can be employed to help us 
better understand the environment that allows organized hypocrisy and organizational facades to be 
developed and sustained within organizations. Parallels between the ideas present in the notion of 
symbolic manipulation and organizational facades may enhance both models of corporate 
sustainability activities through, perhaps, textual analysis of corporate communications. 
 
4. Contributions of this special issue 
The focus of the Special Issue of SAMPJ “Camouflaging of corporate (un)sustainability” is 
clearly of great relevance for firms, stakeholders and policy makers as there is an expectation that 
accounting tools, such as sustainability reports, should be consistent with organizations' actions. 
Concerns with the current state of knowledge in the area of sustainability accounting and 
management have clearly emerged in the academic research community and most certainly need 
further encouragement. For contributions of this special issue we were primarily interested in papers 
that engage in this debate by critically examining policies and practices in sustainability reporting, 
social and environmental performance measurement systems, and the mechanisms organizations 
may and/or have put in place to manage and control their social and environmental impact. Overall, 
we believe the contributions we collected all together speak to these purposes and enhance our 
understanding of the camouflaging phenomenon.   
The first two papers are anchored in legitimacy theory and explore, respectively, the use of 
CSR disclosure during a legitimacy crisis and as a “disguising” strategy. The first contribution by 
Vourvachis et al. (2016) analyses corporate social responsibility disclosure reactions to catastrophic 
accidents suffered by major airlines. The paper extends the body of research on corporate disclosure 
reactions to catastrophic events, which has mainly focused on environmental disasters, by 
considering a broader spectrum of social disclosures. The second article, by Murphy and Giles 
(2016), is a response to Hopwood’s (2009) call for research into the complex motivations that 
explains social and environmental reporting. Using the lens of legitimacy theory, the paper focuses 
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on the change in social and environmental reporting for firms using Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation (SLAPPs). SLAPPs represent a relevant legal mechanism designed to address 
corporate legitimacy (Murphy and Giles, 2016) and try to stop individuals engaged in public debate 
criticizing the corporation. Using three cases of SLAPPs, the paper provides evidence that social 
and environmental reporting is part of a broader communication strategy aimed to “limit and 
disguise” the actions of the firm. The third contribution of the Special Issue draws on neo-
institutional theory and focuses on the “behind the scene” of CSR reporting. Patten and Zhao (2016) 
explore managerial perceptions of CSR reporting in China, with an exclusive focus on state-owned 
enterprises. Data gathered from interview with managers of these firms is used to explore whether 
CSR reporting is explained by governmental coercive, or other institutional-based pressures. 
Overall the evidence in this paper helps identify changes that might be necessary to ultimately 
improve the reporting practices of these Chinese firms. The fourth paper, by Costa and Pesci 
(2016), looks into the notion of social impact measurement for social enterprises and promotes a 
framework of analysis that relies on multiple-constituency theory. The paper convincingly criticizes 
the “golden standard approach” to social impact measurement. It further argues that the adoption of 
a multi-constituency approach should discourage organizations from engaging in camouflaging 
practices because social impact metrics would be defined and constructed together with the 
stakeholders. Finally, Gomez-Carrasco et al. (2016) propose and develop a theoretical framework 
for corporate social responsibility building on Carroll’s (1991) and Kramer and Porter’s (2006) 
models and speaks to the literature investigating the relationship between financial and social 
performance, in that it provides guidance for constructing empirical proxies for social performance. 
The framework addresses the idea of camouflaging by conceptually discussing the “illusion of 
CSR”, the illusion that occurs when a company implements a CSR strategy disconnected from the 
core business and based on mere philanthropy.  
Clearly, the five contributions draw on a broad range of theoretical lenses, and the breadth of 
the research questions analysed enhance our understanding of the camouflaging phenomenon. This 
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Special Issue of SAMPJ aims to contribute to this area of research by offering evidence of the many 
contexts and events linked to a variety of camouflaging dimensions of firms’ activities. The studies 
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